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INTRODUCTION 
For most people, the prototypical criminal offense involves an ac-
tion that is clearly and unambiguously morally blameworthy, such as 
an unjustified act of violence or taking of property.  Yet many crimes, 
especially so-called white collar crimes, exist in a realm of substantial-
ly greater ambiguity.  In a previous article, we examined lay intuitions 
toward a series of white collar offenses—fraud, perjury and false 
statements, and bribery and gratuities—in an effort to determine how 
lay people distinguish between criminal fraud and “sharp dealing,” 
bribery and “horse trading,” perjury and “wiliness on the witness 
stand,” and the like.1  In this study, we examine lay views of insider 
trading. 
Our system of securities law prohibits investors from buying or sell-
ing stock on the basis of “non-public” information unless such infor-
mation is first disclosed.  Those who engage in insider trading can be 
prosecuted criminally or subjected to substantial civil sanctions.2  Yet, 
as in the case of the other white collar offenses we have studied, the 
line between illegal insider trading and mere “savvy investing” can 
seem elusive.  Some even argue that insider trading should not be 
prohibited at all.3  Even among those who agree that certain “core” 
cases of insider trading should be illegal, there is likely to be confu-
sion about exactly how to deal with outlying cases and about what 
factors should distinguish violations that are criminal from those that 
are civil. 
We wanted to know what the general public thinks about various 
acts of insider trading and related activity.  If ordinary people agree 
with those who advocate for the abolition of insider trading laws, then 
 
 1. Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar 
Crime Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, and Fraud, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forth-
coming 2012) (manuscript at 1) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Green & Kugler, 
Public Perceptions]. 
 2. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff, 78u-1 (2010). 
 3. See, e.g., HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) 
(most famously). 
GREEN & KUGLER_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012  12:40 PM 
2011] PUBLIC VIEWS OF INSIDER TRADING 447 
those who attempt to enforce such laws will operate at a considerable 
disadvantage.  Offenders will generally not be tarred with moral ap-
probation and potential jurors will wonder whether the pursuit of the-
se actors is worth public resources.  If, as we believe is more likely, 
people do tend to support a prohibition on at least some forms of in-
sider trading, then the limits and priorities they endorse should be of 
interest to policymakers.  As we will explain in Part II, there is reason 
to believe that it is important for the criminal law to maintain a con-
nection to the moral intuitions of the lay public and, when the law 
must differ from that intuition, for it to do so deliberately and coher-
ently. 
We begin by outlining in broad terms the scope of insider trading 
law.  We then explain why it is important to consider how the views of 
the lay public contrast with legal practice.  We present a brief discus-
sion of the psychological literature on procedural fairness, which is 
relevant to understanding lay views on insider trading.  Finally, we 
describe three linked empirical studies that examine lay views of in-
sider trading from several different perspectives. 
I.  GENERAL BACKGROUND ON INSIDER TRADING 
Our system of securities law forbids investors from buying or sell-
ing stock on the basis of “non-public” information, at least in certain 
circumstances.4  Yet the most successful and celebrated investors are 
precisely those who have the best access to (and the best ability to in-
terpret) information that is generally unavailable to the casual inves-
tor, even if it is not, strictly speaking, “non-public.  This dichotomy 
presents something of a puzzle: where does one draw the line be-
tween illegal insider trading and mere savvy investing? 
For many years, courts and commentators have struggled to define 
the proper limits of insider trading.5  Much of the confusion rests on a 
lack of clarity about exactly what harms, if any, insider trading causes 
and who, if anyone, it wrongs.  Some commentators have gone so far 
as to argue that insider trading should be no crime at all.6  Others 
have sought to limit the scope of its coverage in a variety of ways.  
One problem is that no statute or rule specifically prohibits insider 
 
 4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2011). 
 5. For academic commentary on this topic, see Richard L. Lippke, Justice and 
Insider Trading, 10 J. APPLIED PHIL. 215 (1993); Jennifer Moore, What is Really Un-
ethical About Insider Trading?, 9 J. BUS. ETHICS 171 (1990); Alan Strudler & Eric W. 
Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999). 
 6. MANNE, supra note 3. 
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trading.  Rather, the offense has developed mainly through a body of 
judicial interpretations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 
which bar “manipulative or deceptive devices” in connection with se-
curities transactions.7 
There have been several different and sometimes overlapping the-
ories of what conduct should constitute insider trading.  In its broad-
est form, insider trading law was viewed as prohibiting essentially all 
trading by those who had access to non-publicly available infor-
mation, regardless of how those individuals obtained that infor-
mation.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and several 
lower courts—in early cases such as Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. and In re Cady, Roberts & Co.—
justified such a rule primarily on the basis of the supposed unfairness 
of unequal access to such information.8 
The scope of insider trading law under modern case law, however, 
has been more limited.  It focuses less on whether the trader had an 
unfair informational advantage and more on how he came to have 
such an advantage in the first place.9  Thus, under the so-called “clas-
sical” or “traditional” theory of insider trading, trading on material, 
non-public information is illegal only if the trader is a corporate in-
sider.  A corporate insider may be a permanent insider, such as an of-
ficer or director, or a temporary insider, such as a lawyer or consult-
ant.  The rationale is that by trading on information unavailable to 
the public, an insider violates his duty to corporate shareholders.10  
For example, in Chiarella v. United States, the defendant, an employ-
ee at a financial printer responsible for printing deal announcements, 
deduced the identities of takeover targets and, on the basis of that in-
formation, purchased shares before the public announcement led to 
an increase in the shares’ value.11  In overturning the defendant’s 
conviction in the trial court, the Supreme Court rejected the view that 
 
 7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2011). 
 8. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 83925, 1961 WL 59902 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 9. Cf. Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 562-63 
(2011) ("Insider trading law aims at a sometimes difficult-to-specify category of un-
fair, inefficient, or otherwise-undesirable informational advantage. It is good when a 
trader does research to gain an advantage. It is bad when a corporate insider gains an 
advantage simply from having seen a document or having sat in a meeting from 
which she learned about a deal before the public did.") 
 10. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983). 
 11. 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
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merely possessing non-public information made his trading illegal.12  
The Court reasoned that for a trade to constitute insider trading, the 
trader must owe a fiduciary duty to the company’s stockholders or 
derivatively assume the duty of the person who gave him the inside 
information (the “tipper”).13  The mere fact that a trader holds an ad-
vantage, and that a trade is in some sense “unfair,” does not make it 
fraudulent under the securities laws.14 
Under the complementary “misappropriation theory” of insider 
trading, a defendant is liable for violating a pre-existing duty to the 
source of the inside information on which he traded.  For example, in 
United States v. Carpenter, the defendant, R. Foster Winans, a col-
umnist for the Wall Street Journal, was charged with operating a 
scheme through which he would trade in stocks that were to be the 
subject of his forthcoming “Heard on the Street” columns.15  The Se-
cond Circuit held that although Winans owed no duty to the share-
holders of the companies in whose stock he had traded (and therefore 
had not committed insider trading under the classical theory), he did 
owe a duty to the source of the information, his employer, the Jour-
nal.16  Therefore, he had committed insider trading under the misap-
propriation theory.17   
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. O’Hagan is simi-
lar.  There, the defendant was charged with trading on the basis of 
non-public information obtained from his law firm, which represented 
a client contemplating a tender offer for shares of the Pillsbury Com-
pany.18  Because Pillsbury was not a client of his firm, the defendant 
was not liable under the classical theory; he had no duty to Pillsbury’s 
shareholders.  Instead, the Court held that O’Hagan could be held li-
able under the misappropriation theory of insider trading for breach-
ing a duty to the source of the information (namely, his firm and its 
client).19 
 
 12. See id. at 235. 
 13. See id. at 228–229, 230 n.12. 
 14. See id. at 232. 
 15. 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 16. See id. at 1034. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 521 U.S. 642, 648 (1997). 
 19. See id. at 650, 652, 659. 
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II.  WHY CITIZENS’ INTUITIONS ABOUT MORAL 
BLAMEWORTHINESS MATTER 
The law of insider trading, like much white collar criminal law, 
makes fine distinctions between conduct that appears to be merely 
“aggressive business behavior” and conduct that is illegal and poten-
tially criminal.20  We wanted to know whether similar distinctions 
would appear in lay subjects’ judgments about such conduct. 
Citizens’ beliefs about the seriousness of various criminal acts mat-
ter for a number of reasons.21  Most scholars agree that society’s abil-
ity to enforce compliance with the law lies less in the power to impose 
sanctions than it does in its ability to influence the way people live 
their daily lives.  Generally, people refrain from committing crimes 
not because they fear sanctions, but because they believe the underly-
ing conduct is morally wrong.22 Thus, law deters by informing citizens 
that society has decided a certain act is wrong and by persuading 
them to adopt that view.  If the law does not reflect or create a moral 
aversion among the citizenry, then its deterrent power is substantially 
lessened.  As Paul Robinson and John Darley put it: 
The criminal justice system’s power to stigmatize depends on the le-
gal codes having moral credibility in the community.  The law needs 
to have earned a reputation for accurately representing what viola-
tions do and do not deserve moral condemnation from the commu-
nity’s point of view.  This reputation will be undercut if liability and 
punishment rules deviate from a community’s shared intuitions of 
justice.23 
When the criminal law is viewed as a reliable indicator of what the 
community regards as wrongful, citizens are more likely to follow its 
lead in cases that are unclear.  When criminal codes deviate from the 
 
 20. See Green & Kugler, Public Perceptions, supra note 1. 
 21. The discussion in this Section is derived from Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. 
Kugler, Community Perceptions of Theft Seriousness: A Challenge to Model Penal 
Code and English Theft Act Consolidation, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (2010). 
 22. See, e.g., TOM R.TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1992). 
 23. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for 
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2007) [hereinafter Robin-
son & Darley, Intuitions of Justice]; see also PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, 
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(1995); John M. Darley, et al., Community Standards for Defining Attempt: Incon-
sistencies with the Model Penal Code, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 405, 419 (1996); 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1136 (1998). 
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norms of the community, citizens may be less likely to cooperate with 
or acquiesce in the system’s demands.24 
Maintaining consistency between the law and social norms is im-
portant not only in connection with deciding which conduct should or 
should not be criminalized, but also in deciding how much to punish 
for that conduct.  If the legal system imposes more or less punishment 
for certain crimes than citizens believe is deserved, the system seems 
unfair.  It loses its credibility and, ultimately, its effectiveness. 
These considerations play out in an especially interesting way when 
applied to white collar criminal behavior.  In contrast to prototypical 
street crimes for which the primary questions are how wrong an act is 
and what factors may mitigate the wrongfulness, white collar crimes 
often raise the issue of whether an act is wrong at all.  When it is not 
intuitive that certain criminalized conduct is wrong, the potential for 
discord between community attitudes and legal policy increases sub-
stantially, as does the potential for a loss of credibility if the law strays 
from community norms.  Also at stake is what Andrew Ashworth has 
called the principle of “fair labeling”—the idea that “widely felt dis-
tinctions between kinds of offences and degrees of wrongdoing are 
respected and signaled by the law, and that offences are subdivided 
and labeled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the 
law-breaking.”25  If the public endorses a prohibition on insider trad-
ing in general, but balks at its application to a particular kind of case, 
then that, too, would raise issues of legitimacy. 
We are not arguing that the criminal law should always follow popular 
opinion, or that people’s moral intuitions are necessarily correct or immune 
from persuasion.  Moreover, we recognize that present attitudes toward in-
sider trading are likely shaped by the fact that it has been criminalized for 
the last several generations.  In formulating an effective and authoritative 
criminal law, however, it is essential to know what people’s intuitions are 
and where they diverge from current or proposed legal rules. If the public 
disagrees with a legal practice despite having been exposed to it for many 
years, that is of particular note because it implies that there is a limit to the 
flexibility of popular attitudes on that issue. 
 
 24. See Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral 
Mandate Violations on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1239, 
1240 (2008); Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 23, at 23; William 
Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2000). 
 25. James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labeling in Criminal Law, 71 MOD. 
L. REV. 217, 219 (2008) (quoting ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 88 (4th ed. 2003)). 
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III.  PREVIOUS STUDIES OF COMMUNITY ATTITUDES 
REGARDING INSIDER TRADING 
The earlier literature on community attitudes towards insider trad-
ing is quite limited.  Meir Statman administered surveys to university 
students and finance professionals in eight countries: Australia, India, 
Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States. 
Subjects read vignettes and were asked to rate the “fairness” of the 
conduct described there.26  One scenario involved a lawyer at a firm 
who received confidential information about a client company’s plan 
to acquire another company.  This lawyer traded stock in the about-
to-be-acquired (non-client) company on the basis of that confidential 
information.  A second scenario involved a person who overheard a 
conversation in which top executives at a well-known firm were dis-
cussing the company’s surprisingly good sales results and bought 
stock in the company on the basis of that presumably confidential in-
formation.  A third scenario involved a trade by a person who relied 
on his “research and skill” (rather than inside information) in decid-
ing to sell stock.27 
Statman found a significant difference in the way the first two sce-
narios were perceived in different countries and by the two separate 
groups of subjects (students and finance professionals).  For example, 
in the first scenario, only 5% of finance professionals in the United 
States and the Netherlands judged the lawyer’s conduct acceptable, 
followed by Australia and Israel, where 16% of finance professionals 
judged his behavior acceptable.  In Tunisia, Italy, India, and Turkey, a 
much higher percentage of respondents deemed the lawyer’s conduct 
acceptable (41%, 43%, 49%, and 56%, respectively).28  Among stu-
dents, a higher percentage tended to view the lawyer’s conduct as ac-
ceptable, with a similar distribution generally observable across coun-
tries.  For example, 36% of students in the U.S. found the lawyer’s 
conduct acceptable, compared with 76% in India.29  In the case of the 
person who overheard the conversation about sales figures, a much 
higher percentage of subjects viewed his conduct as acceptable, alt-
hough here the two groups of subjects were flipped: 72% of the finan-
cial professionals in the U.S. said his behavior was acceptable, while 
only 57% of the students said it was acceptable.  Similar patterns ap-
 
 26. See Meir Statman, Is it Fair? Perceptions of Fair Investment Behavior across 
Countries, 12 J. INV. CONSULTING 45, 48 (2011). 
 27. See id. at 48–49. 
 28. See id. at 48. 
 29. See id.  
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peared in the other countries. 30  As for the case of the investor who 
relied merely on skill and knowledge, an extremely high percentage 
of both students and professionals in all countries viewed his conduct 
as acceptable.31 
Statman attributed the difference between the views of financial 
professionals and university students to differences in their level of 
familiarity with the law of insider trading.  Financial professionals, 
who were likely more familiar with the law, were more likely to think 
insider trading behavior was unfair.32  Statman linked differences 
among subjects in different countries to diverging attitudes about cor-
ruption.  Subjects from countries with a lower tolerance for corrup-
tion, as measured by Transparency International’s Corruption Per-
ception Index,33 were more likely to view insider trading as unfair.34 
We think the Statman study offers useful insights into the way the 
public views some core types of insider trading.  From our perspec-
tive, however, the study reflects several significant limitations.  It did 
not go beyond core cases of insider trading, into the realm where 
some of the most interesting moral ambiguities and most perplexing 
legal issues lie.  For example, the study did not ask subjects whether 
the conduct should be treated as a crime or subject to civil sanctions, 
nor did it ask about the difference between tipper and tippee liability.  
It also did not vary the amount of money earned in the trade, and did 
not distinguish between merely “possessing” and actually “using” 
confidential information.  Although we agree that the concept of un-
fairness likely plays a significant role in why people view insider trad-
ing as blameworthy, we do not think that unfairness exhausts the 
moral content of insider trading.  We think there are other plausible 
explanations for why insider trading is viewed as wrong, reflected in 
both the case law and academic literature that need to be considered 
as well—most especially, breach of duty to the source of the confi-
dential information 
IV.  POSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS OF OPPOSITION TO 
INSIDER TRADING 
As noted above, early insider trading doctrine (in cases like Cady, 
Roberts & Co., and Texas Gulf Sulphur) tended to focus on the idea 
 
 30. See id. at 49. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. at 53 tbl. 6. 
 34. See id. at 53. 
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that a trader who relied on confidential information was benefiting 
from an “unfair” advantage not held by other traders.35  More modern 
doctrine, by contrast, has focused on the trader’s breach of duty to the 
source of the information he used. 
There is a great deal of important psychological work on how peo-
ple perceive and respond to unfairness.  This literature may shed 
some light on the motivations underlying prohibitions on insider trad-
ing.  First, people are reluctant to “buy in” to a system that they do 
not perceive as fair or governed by neutral procedures.  For example, 
Tom Tyler’s work on procedural justice has demonstrated that people 
are more likely to accept and abide by a decision that was reached us-
ing fair procedures, even if the decision goes against their interests.36  
Specifically in the legal context, this kind of procedural fairness has 
been shown to matter in a host of real world, high-consequence do-
mains.  The satisfaction of civil litigants depends heavily not only on 
the results of their cases, but also on their perceptions of procedural 
fairness.37  Similarly, defendants in felony cases perceived the verdicts 
they received as more legitimate if they thought the procedures used 
during the trial were fair, independent of whether they were acquit-
ted.38  People who believe that the police employ fair and impartial 
procedures are more likely to cooperate with law enforcement.39 
People are also hostile toward those they perceive as taking unfair 
advantage of a situation, sometimes even to the point of being willing 
to accept pain to punish them.  Consider the example of the ultima-
tum game.  Two players divide a fixed sum of money (often $10 or 
$20).  Player 1 proposes a division and Player 2 must either accept the 
division, causing it to take immediate effect, or reject the division, 
causing both players to lose access to the money.  No communication 
is allowed.  The game creates a tension within Player 2 between the 
strictly rational response, to accept any non-zero offer, and the desire 
to insist on fair treatment.  Behavioral data, gathered across decades 
 
 35. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to 
Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128 (1988). 
 37. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS 81–85 (1975). 
 38. See Johnathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 483, 503 (1988). 
 39. See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Le-
gitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 535 
(2003); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do 
Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 
19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 234 (2001). 
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by more researchers than can be mentioned, suggests that the fairness 
motive dominates; players will generally reject any offer that leaves 
them with less than 30% of the overall pie.40  Though this outcome 
may seem trivial when people are rejecting $3 to $4, the same pattern 
has been observed in cases where larger amounts of money were at 
stake.41  Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues have documented a 
number of additional fairness constraints on economically rational 
behavior.  For instance, not only are people resistant to being treated 
unfairly, but they will also sacrifice personal gain to avoid benefiting a 
person who has previously treated a completely unrelated third party 
badly in a previous ultimatum game.42  People also respond negatively 
to employers who reduce wages in response to a weak labor market, 
and to stores that raise prices on snow equipment right after a storm; 
they apparently see it as unfair to take advantage of the changing 
power dynamic.43 
Taking seriously these two sets of findings, we begin to see the 
genesis of the unfairness rationale for prohibitions on insider trading.  
For the stock market to work as intended, people must be willing to 
“buy in,” and, as we know from the procedural justice literature, this 
willingness can be expected to be contingent on an assurance of fair 
play.  We therefore think it is no accident that Statman found that the 
countries with the best developed financial sectors also had populaces 
that strongly supported insider trading laws.  Widespread public par-
ticipation may require this assurance of facial neutrality.  Given the 
inclination to punish those who violate fairness norms, we can also 
see the impetus for assigning moral condemnation to those who break 
such rules once the rules are established. 
Although there is no corresponding literature on psychological re-
sponses to breaches of obligation, there are a number of studies ex-
amining people’s willingness to cheat or cause harm.  One factor that 
plays a substantial role in this area is the directness of the act.  Psy-
chologists have shown, across a variety of domains and contexts, that 
people tend to perceive objects, events, and other people that are far 
 
 40. See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies, Ultimatums, Dictators 
and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 210 (1995). 
 41. See Lisa Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental 
Evidence from Indonesia, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 47, 58 (1999). 
 42. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 
J. BUS. S285, S291 (1986). 
 43. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Enti-
tlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 734 (1986). 
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away in different ways than those that are close up.44  Nina Mazar, On 
Amir, and Dan Ariely recently demonstrated this phenomenon in a 
series of studies in the context of dishonesty.45  In these studies, the 
researchers asked their subjects to complete a series of basic math 
puzzles within a time limit, and they paid the subjects based on the 
number of problems they solved.  Through various means, the partic-
ipants had the opportunity to cheat, say they had completed more 
puzzles than was actually the case, and therefore receive greater com-
pensation.46  Across all studies, the researchers observed a constant 
but fairly low level of cheating; those who could cheat tended to get 
one to two more questions right than those who could not.47  Interest-
ing for our purposes was a study that manipulated the mechanism 
through which participants received compensation.  In one version, 
participants reported the number of questions they answered correct-
ly directly to the person who would pay them.  In another version, 
participants reported the correct number to a separate person who 
paid them in tokens that participants took across the room to ex-
change for cash.  Though the conditions were morally indistinguisha-
ble, cheating was substantially more common in the condition in 
which tokens were used as an intermediary between the cheating and 
the unearned gains.48 
A further demonstration of the power of indirect action comes 
from the domain of moral psychology.  A line of research conducted 
by Adam Moore and his colleagues has shed new light on the class of 
moral reasoning dilemmas that the classic Trolley Problem exempli-
fies.49  The classic case involves a runaway trolley heading down a 
track on which five men are working obliviously.  The actor has the 
option of flipping a switch, causing the trolley to instead go down a 
track that contains only a single workman.  The question for the 
reader is whether it would be morally acceptable for the actor to flip 
 
 44. See generally Yacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 
PSYCHOL. REV. 403 (2003). 
 45. See Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance, 44 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008). 
 46. See id. at 635. 
 47. See id. at 641. 
 48. See id. at 637–38. 
 49. See generally Adam B. Moore et al., In Defense of the Personal/Impersonal 
Distinction in Moral Psychology Research: Cross-Cultural Validation of the Dual 
Process Model of Moral Judgment, 6 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 186 (2011); 
Adam B. Moore et al., Who Shalt Not Kill? Individual Differences in Working 
Memory Capacity, Executive Control, and Moral Judgment,  19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549 
(2008) [hereinafter Moore et al., Who Shalt Not Kill?]. 
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the switch.  Moore found that one of the key determinants of the ac-
ceptability of such an action was whether the actor would be required 
to use direct physical force to cause harm, such as pushing a large 
man in front of the trolley, instead of flipping a switch, as in the clas-
sic case.50  If the actor needed to push the sacrificed individual off a 
bridge, shove him through an airlock, or smother him with his hands, 
the action was much less acceptable than if the actor needed to bring 
about the exact same effect by pushing a button.51  This directness 
factor was substantially more important than some elements that tra-
ditionally have philosophical relevance, such as whether the death of 
the sacrificed person was an intentional means to accomplish the ben-
eficial end or a foreseen, but unintended, consequence.52 
How, if at all, are considerations of directness likely to bear on lay 
judgments of the blameworthiness of insider trading behavior? The 
answer to this question may turn on the choice between the unfair-
ness/cheating theory and the breach-of-duty-to-the-source-of-
information theory.  Under the unfairness/cheating approach, the 
harms and wrongs of insider trading primarily affect other traders in 
the market—those without access to the confidential information.  
The harms are fairly indirect in that they are inflicted on a typically 
unidentified target who may not even be aware that he has been 
cheated.  By contrast, under the breach-of-duty-to-the-source-of-
information approach, the harms and wrongs of insider trading typi-
cally affect the company for which the insider trader works or from 
whom he obtained and misappropriated the information.  Here, the 
harms and wrongs of insider trading may be seen as more “direct,” at 
least in normal cases. 
V.  EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PUBLIC VIEWS OF INSIDER TRADING 
We conducted three linked studies intended to elicit lay views of 
insider trading.  The first study focused on the extent to which the 
way a trader obtains inside information affects lay judgments about 
blameworthiness and punishability.  Would our subjects think that 
traders should be blamed and punished merely for trading on the ba-
sis of non-public information, or would they insist that the trader 
breach a duty to the source of the information or to the shareholders 
of the company in whose stock he was trading?  The second study fo-
 
 50. See Moore et al., Who Shalt Not Kill?, supra note 48, at 556. 
 51. See id. at 549. 
 52. See id. at 550 (discussing Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of double effect). 
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cused on lay views regarding a number of narrower, but nevertheless 
significant, issues in insider trading law.  We wanted to see if, and un-
der what circumstances, our subjects would approve of punishing in-
sider trading by means of civil, rather than criminal, sanctions, partic-
ularly with respect to differences in the amount of money earned 
through trading.  In addition, we wanted to test our subjects’ views on 
doctrinal issues concerning “use” versus mere “possession” of confi-
dential information and “tipper” versus “tippee” liability.  The final 
study sought to probe the underlying thinking that might inform sub-
jects’ views about the blameworthiness of insider trading. 
A. Study 1—Initial Look at Insider Trading 
In our initial study, we wished to test whether our subjects would 
make different judgments about culpability based on the means by 
which the trader came to acquire non-public information.  Would our 
subjects think that defendants should be punished merely for trading 
on the basis of an arguably unfair advantage derived from the posses-
sion of non-public information (along the lines of Texas Gulf Sul-
phur), or would they insist that the trader breach a pre-existing duty 
in such trading, whether to shareholders of the firm whose stock they 
were trading in (as required by Chiarella) or to the source of the in-
formation (as in O’Hagan and Carpenter)? 
There is also the question whether insider trading liability should 
apply to those who trade on the basis of inside information when they 
are neither insiders nor misappropriators.  Where such people receive 
information from one who is an insider or misappropriator (a “tip-
per”), they are known as “tippees.” The Supreme Court has held that 
a tippee can be liable for insider trading based on a “derivative” 
breach of duty—that is, a duty that derives from the tipper’s breach.53  
But the Court has made clear that such tippee liability exists only 
when (1) the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers by disclosing the information to the tippee, and (2) the tippee 
knows or should know that there has been a breach.54 
We were particularly interested in those cases in which the tipper 
did not intend to benefit the tippee, as where the tippee overhears a 
conversation that the (inadvertent) tipper thought was private, and 
then trades on that information.  Should such conduct be treated as 
insider trading? Here, the level of intentionality of the listener may 
 
 53. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
 54. See id. at 660. 
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play an important role: passively overhearing a conversation is sub-
stantially less direct than seeking out information as a reporter or 
dealing with it in the course of one’s job as an executive.  The SEC 
has taken the position that a tippee can be liable even where the tip-
per did not intend to benefit the tippee.55  The Supreme Court has not 
considered the issue, but lower courts have split.  At least one lower 
court decision, Securities & Exchange Commission v. Musella, has 
followed the SEC’s position.56  Likewise, at least one lower court de-
cision, Securities & Exchange Commission v. Switzer, has disagreed.57  
We investigate these issues more fully in Study 2. 
To examine lay perceptions of these questions, we formulated a 
scenario in which: an individual has non-public information that ABC 
Corp is about to make a public announcement that it is acquiring a 
majority share in XYZ Corp.  On the basis of this information and 
without disclosing his knowledge of it, the individual buys stock in 
XYZ.  After the merger has been made public, the individual sells the 
stock at a price substantially above what he paid for it, thereby earn-
ing a handsome profit. 
We then presented seven variations of this scenario, each with dif-
ferent facts about who the individual was and how he came to possess 
the non-public information on which he based his trade. 
In three of the variations, the individual trading in XYZ stock was 
an insider at either the acquiring company or the target company.  In 
one case, the trader, Richards, was a senior executive at the target 
company, XYZ.  This scenario corresponded to the so-called tradi-
tional or classical form of insider trading in that the duty Richards 
presumably violated was to the shareholders of his company.  In a se-
cond case, the trader, Williams, again worked for the target company 
in which the stock was bought, but this time as a secretary who han-
dled papers containing confidential information about the merger 
prior to its public announcement.  This case also corresponded to the 
traditional theory, but Williams was arguably less an “insider” than 
 
 55. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 104 (2002). 
 56. See S.E.C. v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 898 F.2d 138 
(2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a law firm manager who gave material non-public infor-
mation to defendants who profited from the information was liable for insider trading 
because he breached a duty of silence to his law firm). 
 57. S.E.C. v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that defendant 
had not committed insider trading where he traded on information overheard in the 
stands at a high school track meet, from a man he knew to be the CEO of a publicly 
held corporation, since CEO “tipper” had not violated a fiduciary duty to his firm’s 
shareholders). 
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Richards.  In a third case, the trader, Brown, was a senior executive at 
the acquiring company, ABC, who bought stock in the target compa-
ny, XYZ.  This scenario corresponded to the so-called misappropria-
tion theory in that the duty that Brown presumably violated was to 
the firm from which he misappropriated the information (ABC), ra-
ther than to the shareholders of the company in which Brown had 
bought shares (XYZ).  We predicted that these three scenarios would 
be judged as most deserving of criminal penalties and that the traders 
who were senior executives would be judged more harshly than the 
secretary, partly because high-powered finance professionals are sup-
posed to know the rules concerning insider trading in a way that cleri-
cal employees might not be expected to, and partly because they are 
presumably much better compensated.  We did not anticipate any 
significant difference between people’s judgments of the executive 
who satisfied the traditional theory (Richards) and the executive who 
satisfied the misappropriation theory (Brown). 
In the next two variations, the trader came into the non-public in-
formation as a result of his work for a third party.  In one case, the 
trader, Buckley, worked as a “markup man” at a commercial printing 
company that prints documents for companies involved in mergers, 
including the merger between ABC and XYZ.58 Although the trader 
was not privy to the information, he deduced it from documents that 
were being printed in his shop.  In the other case, the person doing 
the trading, Anderson, was an investigative reporter for a major busi-
ness newspaper.  Through his sources, he learned about the impend-
ing merger and wrote an article about it.  Just before the article was 
published, and on the basis of the information contained in it, he 
bought stock in XYZ.59  We predicted that the actors in both of these 
cases would be rated as deserving of criminal sanctions, but less than 
the traders in the three cases previously described. 
In the final two variations, the trader had no connection to either 
firm.  In one case, the trader, Taylor, was described as being in the 
back of a cab, on his way home after work, when he found a memo 
marked ‘Confidential – Not for Release.’  The memo describes the 
proposed merger.  In the other case, the trader, White, trades on in-
formation which he happens to overhear at a ball game where several 
 
 58. This scenario corresponds closely to Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 
(1980); see supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 59. This case is analogous to Carpenter v. United States, 791 F.2d 1024 (1986); see 
supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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employees of ABC are discussing the proposed merger.60  In the final 
two variations, the most tangential cases, unintended tippees trade 
based on non-public information.  They provide a strong test of 
whether an unfair informational advantage on the part of the trader is 
a sufficient condition to elicit condemnation. 
1. Study 1 Method 
For this study, we recruited fifty participants from Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk service.  This approach allowed for a diverse sample of 
adult Americans.  Data from two individuals were discarded owing to 
an abnormally fast completion time (less than half the median) or in-
correctly answering a question intended to screen inattentive partici-
pants.61  Of the remaining forty-eight participants (eighteen male, 
thirty female), the median age was thirty-eight.  Of the participants, 
58% had college degrees. 
The study began with a brief description of its procedure.  Partici-
pants were told that the study concerned evaluating how people act in 
social situations.  After giving their consent to continue, participants 
were shown a question, which the instructions told them to bypass ra-
ther than answer.  Those who recorded an answer were marked as in-
attentive, as mentioned above.  Participants then completed a page of 
individual difference questions.  These included self-rated political 
orientation, ranging from one (Very Conservative) to seven (Very 
Liberal); faith in various public institutions such as government, 
courts, defense attorneys, and the like, ranging from one (Not much 
faith) to seven (A lot of faith); and eight items from the Competitive 
World Beliefs scale.62 
Following the individual difference measures, participants were 
given instructions describing the format of the scenarios.  Participants 
were told that they would view a core “story” with multiple possible 
“endings” and that it was for them to determine which distinctions, if 
 
 60. This scenario corresponds closely to Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756; see supra note 
57 and accompanying text. 
 61. See generally Daniel Oppenheimer et al., Instructional Manipulation Checks: 
Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 867 (2009) (explaining the use of applicant screening to increase statistical 
power). 
 62. See generally Chris G. Sibley & John Duckitt, Big-Five Personality, Social 
Worldviews, and Ideological Attitudes: Further Tests of a Dual Process Cognitive-
Motivational Model, 149 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 545 (2009) (explaining the effect of per-
sonality and related dispositions on predictive models). 
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any, were relevant.  All scenarios were presented on the same 
webpage.  The scenarios and their various endings were not labeled. 
After each scenario, participants were asked three questions.  First, 
they were asked to rate the moral blameworthiness of the described 
act on a scale ranging from one (Not at All Blameworthy) to seven 
(Very Blameworthy).  Second, they were asked whether the act 
should be treated as criminal (Yes/No).  Third, they were asked how 
severely, if at all, the person should be punished on a scale ranging 
from one (No Punishment) to seven (Severely Punished). 
Basic demographics (age, sex, occupation, educational attainment, 
and state of residence) were collected at the end of the study.  Partic-
ipants were also asked whether they owned stock or had traded stock 
professionally, whether they had ever bought stock on a tip from a 
friend or relative, and how much they knew about investing in stocks 
and bonds. 
2. Study 1 Results 
As Table 1 shows, the seven scenarios can be grouped loosely into 
three “bands” of seriousness.63  Because blameworthiness, punish-
ment severity, and the percentage of the sample criminalizing an ac-
tivity were consistent in nearly every case, those factors are discussed 
together.  In the first band, containing three scenarios, the person do-
ing the trading in XYZ stock was an insider at either the acquiring or 
target company.  These cases elicited substantial punitiveness ratings 
from our participants.  The two most serious cases were those involv-
ing executives at the acquiring (83%) or acquired (79%) companies.  
The secretary at the acquired company was judged to be slightly less 
blameworthy than the executives, but his conduct was criminalized 
(77%) and punished to the same degree.  Respondents thus made es-
sentially no distinction between the classical and misappropriation 
theories with respect to criminalization, blameworthiness, or punish-
ment. 
 
 63. Data on blameworthiness and punishment severity were analyzed using a re-
peated-measures ANOVA. Scores varied across condition for both blameworthiness 
F(3, 161) =26.56, p < .001 and punishment F(3, 144) = 22.43, p < .001.  Due to a sphe-
ricity violation, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used in these analyses.  Com-
parison of means for those measures (Table 1) is based on post-hoc tests.  The crimi-
nalization question had a binary response format.  We therefore conducted 
McNemar’s within-subjects chi-square tests on that data (one degree of freedom). 
Alpha was set at .05 for all analyses. 
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Table 1—Ratings of Study 1 Scenarios in Terms of 
Blameworthiness, Deserved Punishment, and Percentage of the 
Sample Criminalizing the Activity 
 Blameworthiness Punishment 
Percent Crimi-
nalizing 
Executive at Ac-
quiring Company 
5.69a (1.64) 4.27a (1.81) 83.3%a 
Executive at Ac-
quired Company 
5.52a (1.74) 4.33a (1.74) 79.2%a 
Secretary at Ac-
quired Company 
5.13b (1.81) 4.02a (1.83) 77.1%a 
Markup Man 4.71b (1.77) 3.25b (1.97) 60.4%b 
Reporter 4.63b (1.92) 3.25b (1.99) 58.3%b 
Memo Found in 
Cab 
3.81c (2.14) 2.54c (1.81) 37.5%c 
Remark Overheard 
at Game 
2.94d (1.96) 1.98d (1.48) 18.8%d 
For each variable, numbers sharing subscripts are not significantly different from 
each other.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Blameworthiness and punish-
ment scores are on scales ranging from one to seven. 
In the next band of seriousness, the trader came into the infor-
mation as a result of his work for a third party (either a financial 
printer or a newspaper).  Sixty percent of participants sanctioned the 
markup man, whose case paralleled the facts of Chiarella.  Fifty-eight 
percent of respondents sanctioned the reporter, whose case paralleled 
Carpenter.  This slight mitigation, as compared to the first three cases, 
could be the result of several factors.  Most obviously, these two trad-
ers were operating a step removed from the two companies in ques-
tion.  To the extent that the salient victim of the bad act is the source 
of the information, this added distance may have led people to miti-
gate their punishment.  Still, a strong majority criminalized the ac-
tions of both of these individuals, and this outcome provides support 
for the view that even corporate “outsiders” who trade on the basis of 
inside information should be subject to prosecution in appropriate 
cases. 
In the scenarios making up the final band, the trader had no con-
nection to either firm.  Thirty-seven percent of participants sanc-
tioned the cab rider who found and read the confidential memo, and 
19% sanctioned the person who overheard a conversation at a base-
ball game.  These two cases, particularly the second, represent a hard 
test of the pure unfairness rationale for banning insider trading.  In 
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each case we see that a minority do adopt this view, despite a lack of 
plausible connection or duty between the beneficiary and either firm, 
but that the majority clearly rejects it.  This result lends some cre-
dence to a breach of obligation account: in neither case did the recipi-
ent of information actively pursue that information, and in the case 
where the recipient acquired the information truly incidentally, very 
few people sought to impose punishment. 
From a practical perspective, the social cost of “insider” trading by 
lucky outsiders is likely to be fairly minor.  Few people will find them-
selves in a position to gain such inside information and, if they do, 
they are unlikely to do so repeatedly.  They therefore can cause mi-
nor market distortions, but they certainly do not break the system.  A 
corporate insider, on the other hand, could cheat on a regular basis 
and, if allowed to do so, would ultimately undermine confidence in 
the fairness of the market.64  Perhaps participants were aware, wheth-
er explicitly or implicitly, of this difference.  Another possibility is 
that while participants did not approve of trading by these inadvert-
ent insiders, they nevertheless backed away from labeling them as 
“criminal.”  In Study 2, we included a civil punishment option to ac-
count for this concern. 
Past research has sometimes found differences in punitiveness to-
ward certain kinds of white collar offenders based on the gender, 
race, or educational attainment of the participant.65  In this study, nei-
ther gender, stock market experience, nor educational level had an 
effect.66  Given our comparatively small sample size, it is not neces-
sarily safe to assume that such differences do not exist.  Rather, we 
only assume that, if they do exist, the differences are likely not large.  
The sample was not large enough to test meaningfully for ethnic dif-
ferences. 
 
 64. But see Robert E. Wagner, Gordon Gekko to the Rescue?: Insider Trading as 
a Tool to Combat Accounting Fraud, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 973, 1000–05 (2011) (arguing 
that the assumption that insider trading undermines investor confidence may be un-
founded). 
 65. For a useful summary, see Kristy Holtfreter et al., Public Perceptions of 
White-Collar Crime and Punishment, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 50, 52 (2008). See generally 
James D. Unnever et al., Public Support for Getting Tough on Corporate Crime: Ra-
cial and Political Divides, 45 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 163 (2008). 
 66. For these analyses, we created overall composites of the blameworthiness, 
punishment severity, and criminality measures by averaging across the seven scenari-
os.  None of the individual difference measures (political orientation, competitive 
world beliefs, and trust in various social institutions) correlated with these composite 
scores.  We did not examine race due to the size of the sample and limited number of 
participants from minority groups. 
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B. Study 2—Criminal vs. Civil Liability, Tipper vs. Tippee 
Liability, and Other Doctrinal Puzzles in Insider Trading Law 
From Study 1, we know that people tend to support prohibitions on 
at least some forms of insider trading and are willing to punish those 
who are, in various ways, entrusted with confidential information and 
abuse it for personal benefit.  We also found that people were more 
reluctant to punish in several cases when an individual acquired in-
formation by chance.  To shed more light on the distinctions that are 
important in the law and potentially in lay morality, we conducted a 
second study that considered nuances within insider trading law.  We 
also introduced a new punishment option: participants in Study 2 
could choose between permitting a behavior, criminalizing it, or, new 
to this study, assigning a civil penalty.  This better mirrored the op-
tions available in real life cases and allowed us to see whether partici-
pants actually wanted to permit certain kinds of insider trading or 
were simply reluctant to go so far as to criminalize them. 
1. New Distinctions Investigated in Study 2 
a. “Possessing” vs. “Using” Information 
A defendant who is charged with insider trading will sometimes 
contend that he had planned to purchase or sell the stock regardless 
of the inside information.  For example, business magnate Martha 
Stewart, in defending against insider trading charges brought against 
her in connection with the sale of ImClone stock, claimed that she 
had a standing order with her broker to sell her shares as soon as the 
price dropped below $60 per share.67  The question thus arises wheth-
er the defendant must actually rely on the inside information in decid-
ing whether to trade, or whether mere possession is enough. 
The SEC has traditionally taken the position that possession, ra-
ther than use, of material nonpublic information is sufficient to trig-
ger liability.68  The courts, however, are divided on the issue.  The Se-
 
 67. See United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  As it 
turned out, the SEC’s investigation produced evidence that Stewart and her broker 
had fabricated the existence of such a standing order. See, e.g., Constance L. Hays, 
Stewart Inquiry Is Said to Focus on Lack of a Sell Order, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/28/business/stewart-inquiry-is-said-to-focus-on-lack-
of-a-sell-order.html. 
 68. See, e.g., In re Sterling Drug Inc., No. 14675, 1978 SEC LEXIS 1759, at *13–
14 (Apr. 18, 1978); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2011) (triggering liability when 
a person purchases or sells securities while “aware” of material nonpublic infor-
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cond Circuit has followed the SEC’s “possession” rule, stating that 
“material information cannot lie idle in the human brain.”69  Under 
this approach, the only way that a defendant who was “aware” of such 
information could avoid liability is by showing that he engaged in the 
transaction pursuant to a pre-existing plan, contract, or instruction.70  
By contrast, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that proof of 
use, rather than mere possession, must be shown—the defendant’s 
knowledge of such information must constitute a substantial factor in 
his decision to purchase or sell the subject securities at a particular 
price or at a particular time.71 
We wanted to see what our lay subjects would think about this is-
sue.  We imagined two contrasting scenarios.  Both involved a senior 
executive at a company buying stock in that company immediately 
before information was released that was expected to make the 
stock’s value increase.  In both cases, the executive was privy to con-
fidential information about the merger prior to its public announce-
ment. 
In one scenario, the executive “[used] the information to assess the 
value of the company and without disclosing his knowledge of it, 
[bought] stock in XYZ.”  Subjects were told that the executive 
“would not have bought the stock if he did not have this infor-
mation.”  In the other scenario, subjects were told that, in addition to 
the inside information, the executive had “access to the same public 
information about the company as everyone else” and would have 
bought stock in XYZ even if he had not had the confidential infor-
mation. 
We predicted that our subjects would regard the executive who ac-
tually relied on the information in making his decision to buy the 
stock as more blameworthy than the executive who relied on other 
information and would have bought the stock anyway.  Where the 
trader actually relied on the information, he used his arguably unfair 
advantage to gain an upper hand.  In that sense, he cheated.  In the 
other scenario, he did not rely on his unfair informational advantage 
and in that sense cannot be said to have cheated. 
 
mation). See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 374 
(5th ed. 2009). 
 69. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 70. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(A). 
 71. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998); S.E.C. v. Ad-
ler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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b. Amount of Insider Trader’s Profits and Professional Status of 
Trader 
In theory, any actor who commits insider trading, however defined, 
is potentially subject to criminal penalties.72  In practice, however, on-
ly a relatively small percentage of insider trading cases lead to crimi-
nal charges.  Most are treated civilly.73  Two factors that play an im-
portant role in determining whether an insider trading case will be 
pursued criminally by the DOJ or just civilly by the SEC are: (1) how 
much money the individual earned from the insider trading scheme; 
and (2) whether the trader was a licensed professional, such as an in-
vestment banker, broker, trader, investment adviser, attorney, or ac-
countant.74 
Probably the most significant factor that determines whether a case 
will be treated as civil or criminal is the size of the defendant’s ill-
gotten gains.  According to a recent study by the New York State Bar 
Association, the DOJ is much more likely to prosecute those cases in 
which the amount of money earned was greater than $100,000.75  Cas-
es involving smaller profits will normally be treated civilly.  The same 
study also shows that licensed professionals are substantially more 
likely to face criminal prosecution than officers and directors of pub-
lic companies who conduct insider trading in their companies’ stock.76 
 Using the same basic scenario as above (senior executive trades 
on the basis of inside information), we offered two variations.  In one, 
as a result of the transaction, the executive made a profit of $25,000.  
In the other, the executive made a profit of $250,000.  We predicted 
 
 72. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 73. Under the Department of Justice’s United States Attorneys’ Manual, even if 
there is evidence to show that a person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense, the 
prosecutor should decline prosecuting if, among other things, there is an “adequate 
non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” 9-27.220: Grounds for Commencing or De-
clining Prosecution, USAM PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, http://www. 
justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220 (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2012).  The AUSA should also decline prosecution if: (1) “No substantial 
Federal interest would be served by prosecution,” or (2) “The person is subject to ef-
fective prosecution in another jurisdiction.” Id. 
 74. See Securities Subcommittee of the White Collar Criminal Litig. Comm., 
Criminal Prosecutorial Discretion in Insider Trading Cases: Let’s Look at the Num-
bers, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, 3–4, (May 12, 2010), http://www.nysba.org/Content/ 
ContentFolders4/CommercialandFederalLitigationSection/ComFedReports/CRIMI
NALPROSECUTORIALDISCRETIONINTHEINSIDERTRADINGCASES.pdf. 
 75. See id. at 13. 
 76. See id. at 9 (explaining that during the relevant time period, DOJ pursued 
61% of cases involving licensed professionals and only about 33% of cases involving 
officers or directors of public companies). 
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that our subjects would find the executive who obtained a profit of 
$250,000 more deserving of punishment than the executive who 
earned only $25,000. 
In one sense, the difference between the executive who earned 
$25,000 and the executive who earned $250,000 is a matter of “moral 
luck.”  The issue is similar to that which arises in the case of unsuc-
cessful, or partially successful, attempts.  Imagine two pickpockets at 
work in a crowd.  Both are equal in terms of skill, determination, and 
neediness.  Yet the “lucky” pickpocket finds a wallet bursting with 
hundred dollar bills, while the “unlucky” pickpocket finds a wallet 
that turns out to be empty.  Is the unlucky pickpocket any less 
blameworthy than the lucky one?  Should his punishment be any less?  
People’s intuitions vary widely, and there is a large body of ethics and 
philosophy of law literature about whether, all else being equal, the 
unlucky wrongdoer should be punished any less severely than the 
lucky one.77  Previous empirical studies have found that, despite the 
deep divide among scholars, most lay people believe that the unlucky 
attempter should in fact be punished less severely than the lucky 
one.78 
 Of course, everything else here is not necessarily equal.  Our 
scenarios did not explain why one trader earned so much more from 
his trading than the other.  It could be that he traded a much larger 
number of shares of stock, or perhaps the stocks he invested in were 
more valuable, or perhaps the swing in price was significantly greater.  
The study instrument did not say.  Instead, we simply focused on the 
fact that trader 1 was more successful than trader 2, and therefore ar-
guably caused more harm to some unidentified victim or to the mar-
ket generally. 
We also varied the trader’s professional status.  In one set of sce-
narios, the trader was a “top executive” at a large company.  In other 
scenarios, the trader was a secretary at the firm or a markup man at a 
financial printer.  We predicted that, other things being equal, the ex-
ecutive would be judged more harshly than the others, both because 
he would be expected to have a higher level of familiarity with the 
 
 77. See generally, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, Taking the Consequences, in AC-
TION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 107 (Stephen Shute et. al. eds., 1993); THOMAS 
NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Moral Luck, in MOR-
AL LUCK 35 (Robert B. Louden ed., 1981); Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994); Sanford Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law 
and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994). 
 78. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: 
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 186–88 (1996). 
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law, and because his compensation, absent the insider trading, would 
presumably be higher. 
c. Tipper vs. Tippee Liability 
 Most of the cases we have looked at so far have involved per-
sons with inside information who themselves trade on the basis of 
such information.  But what about cases in which an insider gives 
nonpublic information to another individual, and it is the second indi-
vidual who does the trading? How should the liability of the “tipper” 
(the person who discloses material, nonpublic information to another 
individual) compare to the liability of the “tippee” (the person who 
trades on the basis of the information received from the tipper)? 
Other things being equal, should the tipper be regarded as more, less, 
or equally blameworthy to the tippee? 
The courts have said that the tippee’s liability is “derivative” of the 
tipper’s.  Thus, if the tipper is not liable (say, because he had no duty 
of confidentiality to the source of information), then the tippee also 
would not be liable.79  This does not necessarily mean that the tipper 
will be subject to more serious punishment than the tippee, though as 
a practical matter tippers do seem to face a higher risk of criminal 
prosecution than do tippees or sole actors.  For example, in the New 
York Bar study cited above, 58% of the SEC defendants selected by 
the DOJ for prosecution were tippers, whereas 36% were  tippees, 
and 6% were sole actors who did not tip anyone.80 
But why should the tippee’s liability be thought of as derivative of 
the tipper’s? It is the tippee, after all, who actually engages in  trad-
ing.  Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the tipper’s liabil-
ity is derivative of the tippee’s—that the tipper is in some sense an 
accomplice or aider and abettor of the tippee’s conduct.  Under this 
approach, the tipper is like the actor who provides a gun to the 
would-be killer, but does not use it himself. 
There are really two questions at issue here.  The first is: which 
kind of liability is conceptually more basic—the tipper’s or tippee’s? 
The answer to this question turns on the deeper question of why in-
sider trading is wrong to begin with.  If one believes (as Green has ar-
gued) that the basic wrong of insider trading lies in the fact that the 
insider uses an unfair advantage against other traders and thereby 
 
 79. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 80. See Criminal Prosecutorial Discretion in Insider Trading Cases: Let’s Look at 
the Numbers, supra note 74, at 3. 
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“cheats” them, then it would seem that it is the tippee who commits 
the more basic wrong, and that the tipper’s liability is derivative.  If, 
on the other hand, one believes (as does a majority of the Supreme 
Court) that the basic wrong in insider trading is the misappropriation 
of information, then it would seem that the more basic wrong is 
committed by the tipper, and that the tippee’s liability is the deriva-
tive one. 
The second question is whether any of this should make a differ-
ence in practice.  Regardless of which form of liability is conceptually 
more basic, we might simply decide that the two should be treated as 
equally worthy of punishment.  This is what has generally occurred 
with accomplice liability in criminal law, where the same punishment 
typically applies to both the offender who gives support and the of-
fender who directly causes the harm.81 
For present purposes, we cannot hope to resolve either of these is-
sues.  Instead, we are simply interested in knowing how our lay sub-
jects would judge the question of relative blameworthiness.  All else 
being equal, who do they believe is more deserving of punishment: 
the tipper who gives confidential information to another individual, 
or the tippee who receives the information and trades on the basis of 
it?  Or do they think they should be treated as equivalent? 
An additional question related to the liability of the tipper is 
whether he must obtain any personal benefit from making the tip.  
Traditionally, under the classical theory, a defendant who is prosecut-
ed for insider trading will incur liability only if he “personally benefit-
ted” from the tip.82  The leading case is Dirks v. Securities & Ex-
change Commission.83  In Dirks, Secrist, a former employee of Equity 
Funding American (EFA), revealed to an investment analyst, Dirks, 
 
 81. Though Green has argued here as well, contrary to the prevailing view, that 
this outcome is a mistake and that accomplices ordinarily ought to be punished less 
severely than principals. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A 
MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2006). See generally Joshua Dressler, 
Reassessing the Theoretical Understandings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions 
to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985). 
 82. If the defendant is prosecuted under the misappropriation theory, however, 
some district courts have explicitly held that the personal benefit test is inapplicable. 
See S.E.C. v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); S.E.C. v. Musella, 
748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).  On the other hand, a number of 
courts have held that proof of personal benefit is a required element to prove tip-
per/tippee liability under the misappropriation theory.  The most significant opinion 
is the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in S.E.C. v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 83. 463 U.S. 646. 
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that EFA was being fraudulently managed, a fact that constituted ma-
terial, nonpublic information.  Apparently, Secrist’s sole motivation 
in revealing this information to Dirks was to reveal the fraud.  Dirks, 
in turn, revealed this information to a number of people, including his 
own clients, who thereafter sold their shares in EFA.84  The Supreme 
Court held that Dirks was not liable for insider trading, finding that, 
absent personal benefit to Secrist as a result of the tip to Dirks, 
Secrist had not breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders.85  The 
Court also identified three types of personal benefit that a tipper may 
receive from making a tip: (1) a pecuniary benefit (such as a kickback 
or profit-sharing arrangement); (2) a reputational benefit (such as 
when a corporate officer provides information to an analyst in hopes 
that the analyst will report about him favorably); and (3) a benefit 
from making a gift.86 
To test our subjects’ views on these issues, we gave them several 
scenarios involving both tippers and tippees and asked them to judge 
their relative blameworthiness.  In each of these scenarios, we con-
trasted the blameworthiness and punishment meted out to the tipper 
with that assigned to the tippee, and both to the baseline case of an 
executive trading on his own inside information for his own benefit.  
In one tipper/tippee scenario, the executive did not himself trade on 
inside information, but passed the information on to a professional 
stock analyst whom he knew casually and with whom he hoped to do 
business in the future.  The executive hoped to impress the analyst 
with his access to inside information.  The analyst then bought stock 
based on the inside information.  This was the tip-for-gain case.  In a 
contrasting scenario, an insider at a company revealed confidential in-
formation to a business reporter with the intent of exposing fraudu-
lent business practices and protecting shareholders from (in this case) 
a bad merger.  No personal benefit, except perhaps reputational, 
would accrue to the “tipper” in this case—paralleling the Dirks case.  
The reporter then traded on the information, making a substantial 
profit. 
We predicted that, other things being equal, our subjects would 
view the person who actually uses the confidential information to buy 
stock (the tippee) as more blameworthy than the person who merely 
divulges the information and does not use it (the tipper).  This would 
reflect our view that the principal wrong in insider trading comes 
 
 84. See id. at 649. 
 85. See id. at 666–67. 
 86. See id. at 663–64. 
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from a  sole trader or tippee using an unfair advantage vis-à-vis other 
investors, and that the tipper is merely an accomplice in this act.  This 
would be especially clear if the tipper’s motive was innocent; being 
the unwitting accomplice to another’s insider trading should attract 
relatively little punishment. 
d. Existence of Confidential Relationship 
As noted above, the misappropriation theory of insider trading ap-
plies only when stock is traded on the basis of “material nonpublic in-
formation misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confi-
dence.”87  To find out when our subjects would find a breach of the 
duty of trust or confidence, we constructed two scenarios.  In one 
case, an executive leaked information to his brother with the intent of 
impressing him (as in the tip-for-gain case).  The brother then traded 
on the information, making a handsome profit.  This was, more or 
less, the scenario contemplated by SEC Rule 10b5-2, which imposed 
liability where the disclosing person and the recipient have a familial 
relationship, even in the absence of some other duty of confidentiali-
ty.88 
We also thought it was worth posing a case in which a confidential 
relationship arises out of a different sort of association.  We had in 
mind a class of cases in which a government employee has advanced 
notice of still-confidential information that would affect the value of a 
given stock—for example, information about whether a drug is about 
to be approved for general distribution; whether a judge is going to 
rule for the plaintiff or the defendant; whether a legislator will vote 
yes or no on proposed legislation.  People who have access to such in-
formation as government employees may arguably have an even 
higher level of duty to maintain confidences than those in private 
business.89  We therefore constructed a scenario in which an official at 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had advance knowledge 
that a drug is about to be approved.  The official buys stock in the 
drug company prior to the announcement and later sells it, making a 
handsome profit. 
 
 87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(a) (2011). 
 88. See id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3).  
 89. In our previous work on bribery and gratuities, we found that government of-
ficials were held to higher standards than corporate officials. See Green & Kugler, 
Public Perceptions, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22). 
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2. Study 2 Method 
Once again, we solicited participants for this study from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk service.  Because of the greater number of scenarios 
in this study, we recruited 101 subjects.  Data from three individuals 
were discarded owing to an abnormally fast completion time (less 
than half the median) or incorrectly answering a question intended to 
screen inattentive participants.  Of the remaining ninety-eight partici-
pants (forty-four male, fifty-four female), the median age was twenty-
eight.  Of the participants, 53% had college degrees. 
The procedure for the second insider trading study mirrored that of 
the first with several important exceptions.  First, this study—owing 
to the greater number of scenarios—split the various scenarios across 
web pages.  As a result, the participants could not easily view all of 
the cases before beginning to respond, but it was possible for partici-
pants to move backward and forward through the survey and modify 
their answers, if they so desired.  This format did, however, raise the 
possibility of order effects.  To address this concern, we created two 
orders and contrasted them in analysis. 
To review, we employed a substantial number of scenarios in this 
study.  As described above, we had a pair of scenarios contrasting an 
insider who used information as the basis for his trade with one who 
possessed the information, but would have made the stock purchase 
even without it; a pair contrasting large and small gains, three sets of 
tippers and tippees; and one government official trading in advance of 
a regulatory decision.  We also reused the memo-found-in cab and 
remark-heard-at-ballgame scenarios to see if the civil punishment  op-
tion altered responses. 
We also made a substantial change to one of the answer choices.  
We maintained the blameworthiness and punishment severity ques-
tions without modification, but the criminality question was replaced 
with one asking whether the conduct described should be permitted, 
treated civilly, or punished criminally.  We added a special instruction 
screen at the beginning of the study to explain the distinction between 
civil and criminal penalties  and asked subjects to describe the distinc-
tion in their own words. 
Finally, we made two small methodological changes.  As noted 
above, the individual differences measured in Study 1 failed to affect  
the scenario judgments.  We therefore removed many of the attitudi-
nal items, retaining only the overall ratings of political orientation 
and  demographics (including stock-related questions).  Also, as we 
split the scenarios across multiple study screens, we modified our sce-
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narios so that they “stood alone” more effectively; the scenarios were 
all freestanding rather than being endings to a common story. 
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3. Study 2 Results 
Responses to the scenarios did not differ across the two scenario 
orders;  for example, participants gave the same ratings to the scenar-
ios contrasting high versus low amount gained whether they preceded 
or followed the “would have bought anyway” cases, and the same rat-
ings to the “tip for gain” case regardless of whether it was the first or 
last of the tip cases.  This allowed us to combine participants across 
orders in all subsequent analyses.  The design of this study was cen-
tered on a series of planned contrasts (between tippers and tippees, 
large and small gains, would or would not have bought anyway, et 
cetera).  We therefore employed a somewhat different analysis strat-
egy and report only those contrasts rather than a comprehensive 
analysis.90  We also compare the scenarios within a pair to the case in 
which a classic insider makes a stock purchase based on inside infor-
mation that he otherwise would not have made.  This case reflected a 
prototypical example of insider trading and could serve as a baseline. 
a. Liability for Direct Buyers 
For our first contrast, we compared the cases in which the insider 
possessed inside information, but did not rely on it—and thus would 
have made the stock purchase anyway—with the case in which the in-
sider would not have otherwise purchased the stock.  The data show 
that lay people can and do draw a distinction here: when the insider 
would have made the stock purchase anyway, he was blamed signifi-
cantly less and people wished to punish him significantly less severely.  
When evaluating how the case should be resolved, people selected 
harsher channels (criminal over civil, civil over no punishment) when 
evaluating the actor who used the information as a basis for trading.91  
When the actor would have bought anyway, a substantial minority 
thought that the conduct was entirely permissible (43%) and most of 
the remainder would have opted for a civil penalty.  When the execu-
tive would not have otherwise purchased the stock, in contrast, only 
 
 90. For the blameworthiness and punishment severity questions, we used within-
subjects t-tests.  Our analysis approach in this study differs in that we report only the 
planned contrasts and therefore are less likely to have a multiple comparison issue.   
The question asking whether the conduct should be permitted, treated civilly, or pun-
ished criminally was coded for each set of paired scenarios to reflect whether one 
scenario was to be treated with more, equally, or less serious means than the other.  
The more and less serious options were then contrasted using a McNemar test, as be-
fore. 
 91. Blameworthiness t = 10.14, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 9.55, p < 0.001; 
preferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 94) = 40.14, p < 001. 
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12% of participants thought his conduct was permissible and a full 
38% thought it merited criminal treatment. 
The two scenarios which varied the size of the gain were rated as 
equally blameworthy, but they were punished differently.  When 
evaluating the actor who made the larger gain, participants assigned 
greater punishment and were more likely to prefer criminal sanctions 
(45%) than when evaluating the actor who made a smaller gain (34% 
for criminal sanctions).92 These differences, though small, show that 
participants were willing to prioritize when meting out punishment 
even while seeing blameworthiness as constant. 
The confidential-memo-found-in-cab and remark-overheard-at-
ballgame cases presented traders who came into insider information 
accidentally, rather than within the context of a previously existing 
duty.  The trader who reads the confidential memo left behind in a 
cab is blamed and punished less than the actor in the control would-
not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade case, and participants were much 
more likely to judge his conduct as permissible.93  Interestingly, the 
trader in the ballgame case was blamed and punished even less than 
the trader in the cab case.94 As we speculated in Study 1, this may be 
because the person finding the memo in the cab took some direct ac-
tion to acquire the information and was at least made aware, by the 
label on the memo, that the information was confidential.  The addi-
tion of a civil penalty option may have had some effect on results, as 
the permissible/not criminal option was down 10% in this study as 
compared to Study 1. 
Finally, the FDA case presented an interesting wrinkle on insider 
trading.  The FDA official may have a duty of confidentiality to his 
employer (the government) or a derivative duty as part of an agency 
entrusted to review trade secrets, but he does not have a direct duty 
to the company in question.  In that sense, this scenario is closely 
analogous to the Carpenter case.  But participants still viewed the of-
ficial as acting inappropriately.  He was blamed as much, punished as 
severely, and subject to criminal punishment as often as the actor in 
the would-not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade case.95 
 
 92. Blameworthiness t = 1.22, ns.; punishment severity t = 6.75, p < 0.001; pre-
ferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 91) = 5.56, p < 05. 
 93. Blameworthiness t = 7.48, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 8.63, p < 0.001; 
preferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 94) = 37.93, p < 001. 
 94. Blameworthiness t = 6.56, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 11.61, p < 0.001; 
preferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 92) = 20.01, p < 001. 
 95. Blameworthiness t = 1.52, ns.; punishment severity t = 0.85, ns.; preferred 
treatment method  2 (1, N = 94) = .22, ns. 
GREEN & KUGLER_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012  12:40 PM 
478 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
b. Tipper/Tippee Liability 
Reactions to the tippers and tippees in our scenarios depended 
greatly on the circumstances of the tip.  When the executive tipped 
the analyst for personal gain, participants blamed the executive ap-
proximately the same amount as the analyst, and punished him slight-
ly less.  This judgment, however, had no impact on whether partici-
pants believed the conduct should be treated civilly or criminally.96  
As in the small and large gain cases, this may reflect punishment pri-
orities.  The analyst’s purchase of the stock is seen as being as blame-
worthy, deserving of punishment, and worth pursuing criminally or 
civilly, as was the defendant in the would-have bought-the-stock-
anyway executive case.97  The tippee received no liability discount. 
An executive tipping a reporter to expose a bad deal produces a 
very different set of reactions.  Participants blamed and punished the 
reporter as much as in the would-not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade 
case and were as likely to punish him civilly and criminally.98  Partici-
pants blamed and punished the executive tipping for apparently altru-
istic reasons far less, however.  The participants were also much less 
likely to subject this executive to sanctions than the reporter or the 
executive in the would-not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade case.  Of 
the participants, 54% thought that the executive’s conduct in tipping 
for altruistic reasons should be permissible, and only 7% thought it 
should be subject to criminal sanctions. 99 
The case involving a tip obtained from a relative was again distinct, 
if only slightly.  Participants blamed and punished both the tipper and 
the tippee less than the executive in the would-not-otherwise-have-
made-the-trade case, but only the tippee was less likely to be dealt 
with civilly or criminally, and that difference was small.  The tipper 
and tippee in this case were treated equivalently.100 
 
 96. Blameworthiness t = 1.82, p = 0.07; punishment severity t = 2.99, p < 0.004; 
preferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 95) = 2.33, ns. 
 97. Blameworthiness t = 0.79, ns.; punishment severity t = 0.08, ns.; preferred 
treatment method  2 (1, N = 93) = 0.10, ns. 
 98. Blameworthiness t = 1.71, ns.; punishment severity t = 1.25, ns.; preferred 
treatment method  2 (1, N = 92) = .023, ns. 
 99. As compared to the reporter: blameworthiness t = 11.17, p < 0.001; punish-
ment severity t = 10.07, p < 0.001; preferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 94) = 44.72, p 
< .001. As compared to the executive who would not have traded but for the nonpub-
lic information: blameworthiness t = 9.96, p < 0.001; punishment severity t = 11.40, p 
< 0.001; preferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 94) = 43.75, p < .001. 
 100. Family tipper compared to would-not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade execu-
tive: blameworthiness t = 2.43, p = 0.02; punishment severity t = 2.08, p = 0.04; pre-
ferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 93) = 2.68, ns.  Family tippee compared to would-
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C. Study 3—Subjects’ Underlying Reasoning 
In our final study, we wanted to further explore the motivations 
underlying lay condemnation of insider trading.  As previously dis-
cussed, one theory holds that insider trading is wrong because it is 
“cheating.”101  It is not merely that one party has an advantage over 
another, but also that the advantaged party has acquired his ad-
vantage in a way that violates the accepted rules of the game.  Though 
the magnitude of the advantage that the various actors hold has gen-
erally been held constant—to the extent that gains have been speci-
fied, they have not varied across most scenarios—participants still 
draw substantial distinctions between cases, apparently based on the 
degree of moral violation involved in obtaining the information.  
Those who are trusted explicitly with inside information are punished 
much more than those who acquire it by chance, for example.  Here, 
we wished to go further in two ways.  First, we wanted to assess lay 
reactions to a case in which a person acquires a substantial advantage 
in a way that does not involve cheating.  Second, we wished to ask 
participants to rate the kinds of wrongs they believed were being 
committed.  When people criminalize the conduct of an executive 
trading in the stock of his own company, are they doing so because 
they feel it is unfair to other investors, because it is a breach of obliga-
tion to the company, or for some other reason? 
We therefore employed four variants of our traditional merger 
scenario.  For each variant, we asked a more extensive series of ques-
tions than in the previous studies.  First, we asked the participants to 
rate the extent to which the actor in the scenario was wronging the 
acquiring company, the acquired company, and other investors.  
Based on the blameworthiness ratings in the previous studies, we had 
reason to believe that participants thought that some party was being 
wronged, but we did not know which party.  We then asked about the 
extent to which the actor had an unfair advantage, was breaching a 
duty to the acquiring company, or was breaching a duty to the ac-
quired company.  Most theories of insider trading turn on breach of 
duty, and we thought  it would be interesting to see whether lay par-
ticipants drew distinctions in this area.  Finally, we asked about the 
 
not-otherwise-have-made-the-trade executive: blameworthiness t = 4.21, p < 0.001; 
punishment severity t = 3.76, p < 0.001; preferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 94) = 
10.01, p < .001.  Family tipper compared to family tippee: blameworthiness t = 1.84, p 
= 0.07; punishment severity t = 1.08, ns.; preferred treatment method  2 (1, N = 95) = 
1.16, ns. 
 101. See GREEN, supra note 80. 
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extent to which the actor was causing harm.  All of these questions 
were answered on seven-point scales ranging from one (Not at all) to 
seven (Very much).  We took three of the scenarios from previous 
studies: the CEOs of both the acquired and acquiring companies and 
the ballgame case.  For each of these, we specified in the question 
whether the actor had a relationship to the company in question. 
We also added a novel case in which an investment analyst with no 
connection to either firm was able to predict the merger using sophis-
ticated and expensive computer software.  This case allows us to as-
sess how participants feel about actors who acquire substantial and 
quasi-exclusive informational advantages, but do so within the gener-
ally accepted rules. 
1. Study 3 Method 
We recruited 132 subjects for this study, once more drawing our 
pool from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service.  Data from six indi-
viduals were discarded due to an abnormally fast completion time 
(less than half the median) or incorrectly answering a question in-
tended to screen inattentive participants.  Of the remaining 126 par-
ticipants (forty-four male, eighty-two female), the median age was 
thirty-seven.  Of the participants, 41% had college degrees. 
The procedure for this study varied slightly from those of the pre-
vious two.  Given the expanded list of dependent measures for each 
scenario, it was necessary to present each one in isolation.  The small 
number of scenarios allowed for use of a Latin square ordering sys-
tem, and four orders were created, allowing each scenario to be pre-
sented first in one instance.  These orders were contrasted in analysis 
and no differences emerged. 
As in Study 2, the criminalization question included a civil punish-
ment option. 
2. Study 3 Results 
Table 3 shows that the broad patterns of the blameworthiness, 
criminality, and punishment severity measures on the three repeated 
scenarios were the same as in Study 2: the ballgame case was seen as 
distinct from the two executive cases, which in turn did not differ.102  
 
 102. ANOVA statistics for this comparison are presented in the table.  On the cat-
egorical criminality data, the person overhearing at the ballgame was treated more 
leniently than the executive of the acquiring company,  2 (1, N = 120) = 73.80, p < 001, 
or the executive of the acquired company,  2 (1, N = 121) = 72.63, p < 001. 
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The savvy investor scenario was seen as less deserving of punishment 
than even the ballgame case, with the overwhelming majority of par-
ticipants stating that the investor’s conduct should be permissible.103 
The novel dependent measures were interesting for the differences 
they did not show.  Across scenarios, these measures tracked the 
blameworthiness and punishment severity measures.  The two CEO 
cases, attracting the highest blameworthiness ratings, were also rated 
as wronging the other investors and the shareholders of each compa-
ny to the greatest extent, being the most unfair, violating the most ob-
ligations, and causing the most harm.  Interesting for our purposes, 
however, was the lack of distinction between these measures.  If one 
party was seen as being wronged, all three parties were.  If an obliga-
tion to one company was breached, the obligation to the other com-
pany was also breached.  If obligations were breached, conduct was 
viewed as unfair, and vice versa.104  In fact, the only noticeable varia-
tion from this pattern involved the two CEOs. The acts of the CEO of 
the acquiring company were judged more wrongful and blameworthy 
than the acts of the other CEO.  This difference is small, however, 
and may not be meaningful. 
One might have expected that the CEO of the acquiring company 
would be seen as having, and therefore breaching, a duty to his own 
company, but not to the other company, and likewise for the CEO of 
the acquired company.  Also, the person overhearing details of the 
merger at a ballgame might be expected to have a duty to the acquir-
ing company because he heard the information from that company’s 
employees, but not to the acquired company.  Instead we find a near 
complete lack of discrimination.  The traders are either doing some-
thing that is morally permissible (the savvy investor), morally grey 
(the ballgame), or morally wrong (the CEOs).  Distinguishing who 
was being wronged, and how, was apparently less possible or less im-
portant in the minds of our participants.  This result is not necessarily 
surprising.  People often have substantial difficulty reporting the ra-
 
 103. ANOVA statistics for this comparison are presented in the table.  On the cat-
egorical criminality data, the savvy investor was treated more leniently than the ex-
ecutive of the acquiring company,  2 (1, N = 121) = 89.06, p < 001, the executive of the 
acquired company,  2 (1, N = 122) = 86.43, p < 001, or the person overhearing at the 
ballgame  2 (1, N = 122) = 16.33, p < 001. 
 104. The correlations between all of the dependent measures were quite high, with 
all of the novel measures correlating at least .50 with each of the three primary out-
comes. 
GREEN & KUGLER_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012  12:40 PM 
482 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
tionales for intuitive judgments.105  In fact, it is arguably more com-
mon for people to form moral judgments based on intuitive feelings 
and only later create rules to justify their decisions than to have rules 
and form judgments based on their application.106  It is possible that, 
in this case, participants were well aware of the conclusion they 
wished to draw—that some of the conduct described was cheating 
and that that was wrong—and simply chose every explanation sup-
porting that result.  
 
 105. See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can 
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 232 (1977). 
 106. See Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intui-
tionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001). 
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CONCLUSION 
Our findings suggest a high degree of correlation, across several 
domains, between lay attitudes concerning insider trading and current 
law and practice. 
In the view of our subjects, merely trading on the basis of an in-
formational advantage not held by other traders does not make such 
trading blameworthy or deserving of punishment.  For example, when 
a trader relied on non-confidential information obtained through his 
own research and skill, our subjects judged his conduct to be without 
blame, even if the information was not generally available to the pub-
lic.  Our subjects were only a bit more critical of the trader’s behavior 
when he relied on (confidential) information obtained through 
chance (as when the information was overheard at a ball game or dis-
covered in the back of a taxi).  It was only when the trader obtained 
the confidential information in some presumably illicit manner, such 
as by appropriating it from his employer or client, that our subjects 
regarded it as clearly worthy of prohibition and censure. 
Lay views also tracked current law and practice with respect to a 
number of narrower doctrinal and practice issues.  For example, our 
subjects agreed with current practice at the SEC and DOJ that only 
insider trading resulting in a large amount of ill-gotten gains should 
result in criminal sanctions, while those trades resulting in compara-
tively small gains should be treated civilly.  On the issue of tipper and 
tippee liability, the views of the lay public were also mostly congruent 
with current law.  For example, if the tipper had selfish motives in giv-
ing information to a tippee, subjects deemed his conduct blamewor-
thy.  But if his motives were altruistic, the subjects did not blame him. 
There is also another area in which we found a striking congruence 
between lay views and the law.  As noted at the outset, courts, regula-
tors, and commentators, while largely condemning insider trading, 
have struggled to define exactly who is wronged or harmed by such 
conduct, and have struggled to determine whether the answer to that 
question varies from case to case.  In any given case, is the victim of 
insider trading the trader on the other end of the transaction?  Is it 
the trading public at large?  Is it the employer or other principal from 
whom confidential information is misappropriated?  Although our 
subjects seemed to have strong intuitions that insider trading is 
wrong, they were unable to isolate the victim in one case from the vic-
tim in another.  In an interesting turn, we think this result suggests 
that professionals and the lay public are united in their confusion over 
the rationale for prohibiting insider trading. 
